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ABSTRACT.		A	renewed	interest	in	aspects	of	high	politics	among	historians	who	subscribe	to	
the	‘new	political	history’	has	coincided	with	the	embrace	by	some	political	scientists	of	
interpretivism	as	a	method	for	understanding	how	beliefs	and	traditions	impact	on	British	
political	life.		In	order	to	examine	the	potential	synergies	between	these	two	developments,	
this	article	utilizes	a	form	of	‘historical	interpretivism’	to	study	the	beliefs	and	actions	of	
senior	civil	servants.		In	1980,	the	British	Government	released	a	Memorandum	of	Guidance	
for	Officials	Appearing	Before	Select	Committees	-	known	ever	since	as	the	‘Osmotherly’	
rules	–	to	help	civil	servants	navigate	the	stresses	of	appearing	before	parliamentary	
committees.		This	article	analyses	the	civil	service	files	in	the	decade	leading	up	to	the	
publication	of	the	Osmotherly	rules	to	reveal	how	senior	civil	servants	sought	to	reconcile	
their	interpretations	of	Westminster	tradition	with	the	need	to	respond	to	the	demands	of	
the	‘open	government’	agenda.		The	article	argues	that	studying	the	narratives	which	guide	
the	beliefs	of	individual	civil	servants	and	their	political	masters	can	help	political	historians	
and	political	scientists	alike	analyse	the	power	of	tradition	in	shaping	political	action.	
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In	1980,	the	Thatcher	Government	publicly	released	the	rules	that	guide	the	behaviour	of	
civil	servants	when	they	appear	before	parliamentary	committees.		The	rules	had	been	
around	in	various	formats	since	at	least	the	1960s	but	had	been	kept	strictly	internal.		The	
public	release	of	the	rules	did	two	things.		Firstly,	it	immortalized	the	name	of	the	civil	
servant	–	Edward	Osmotherly	–	who	was	most	associated	with	their	actual	disclosure	in	
1980.1		The	rules	have	been	known	as	the	Osmotherly	rules	ever	since,	rather	than	by	their	
much	more	cumbersome	formal	modern	title	of	Guidance	on	Departmental	Evidence	and	
Response	to	Select	Committees.2		Secondly,	and	much	more	importantly,	it	allowed	MPs	and	
the	wider	public	an	insight	into	the	workings	of	the	Civil	Service.		The	Osmotherly	rules	did	
more	than	set	out	mundane	procedures.		They	were	an	attempt	by	the	executive	
government	to	formalize	what	MPs	could	appropriately	ask	of	civil	servants	without	
contravening	Westminster	conventions	on	ministerial	responsibility.		The	Osmotherly	rules	
revealed	the	ways	in	which	civil	servants	could	legitimately	avoid	questions	from	MPs	that	
ministers	might	not	want	them	to	answer.			
The	public	release	of	the	rules	represented	a	significant	shift	in	Westminster	
tradition	towards	transparency	at	the	expense	of	the	hitherto	institutionalized	secrecy	pact	
between	ministers	and	civil	servants.		As	one	civil	servant	was	to	note	in	correspondence	in	
the	late	1970s,	making	the	guidance	public	‘…would	seem	to	savour	of	handing	over	to	the	
prosecution	defence	counsel’s	instructions’.3		As	we	enter	the	twenty	first	century,	the	
growing	public	profile	of	select	committees	is	continuing	to	contribute	to	the	growing	public	
profile	of	the	civil	servants	who	appear	before	them.		The	Osmotherly	rules	continue	to	
shape	the	format	that	these	acts	of	public	accountability	can	take.	
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This	article	analyses	the	history	of	what	became	known	as	the	Osmotherly	rules	
through	the	eyes	of	the	civil	servants	involved	in	their	revision	and	eventual	release	in	the	
decade	from	1970-1980.		The	driving	research	question	for	the	study	is:		how	did	senior	civil	
servants	interpret	the	change	towards	greater	transparency	and	parliamentary	
accountability	embodied	in	the	new	rules?		Using	a	framework	of	‘historical	interpretivism’	
the	article	argues	that	civil	servants	behaved	cautiously	in	publicly	releasing	internal	
documents	not	because	of	a	culture	of	self-interested	secrecy,	but	because	of	the	need	to	
somehow	balance	the	competing	claims	of	the	parliament	and	the	executive	on	their	
loyalty.		Having	been	placed	by	the	unwritten	constitution	under	the	control	of	the	
executive	branch	of	government,	civil	servants	were	scrambling	to	avoid	the	complexity	of	
becoming	accountable	to	two	competing	masters	–	the	executive	and	the	legislature.	
The	significance	of	the	Osmotherly	rules	as	a	case	study	is	that	they	are	emblematic	
of	the	tug-of-war	between	competing	visions	for	the	role	of	the	Civil	Service	in	the	years	
between	the	Fulton	Report	of	1968	and	the	election	of	Margaret	Thatcher	in	1979.		One	
constitutionally	conservative	vision	saw	the	traditional	Westminster	relationships	between	
civil	servants	and	ministers	as	being	central	to	the	effective	governance	of	Britain.		The	
other	vision	reflected	the	view	that	this	kind	of	secretive,	oligarchic	partnership	between	
ministers	and	civil	servants	excluded	the	voices	of	the	democratic	electorate	that	they	were	
there	to	serve.		What	a	close	study	of	events	such	as	the	debate	over	the	Osmotherly	rules	
illustrates	is	that	Thatcher’s	dramatic	Civil	Service	changes	of	the	1980’s	represented	an	
escalation	of	debates	that	were	already	strongly	at	play	in	the	1970s.		Following	the	
damning	Fulton	Report	assessment	of	the	generalist	skills	of	civil	servants,	and	in	the	
context	of	the	tremendous	economic	upheavals	of	the	1970s,	debates	over	the	purpose,	
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behaviour	and	shape	of	the	Civil	Service	were	rife,	particularly	in	relation	to	its	level	of	
democratic	accountability.4		In	drawing	out	the	traditions	that	influenced	Civil	Service	
thinking	on	the	Osmotherly	rules,	the	article	exposes	some	of	the	wider	underlying	tensions	
that	Thatcher	was	determined	to	resolve	through	the	introduction	of	New	Public	
Management	in	the	1980s.			
The	sections	that	follow	begin	by	using	the	‘new	political	history’	as	a	lens	through	
which	to	examine	theoretical	debates	in	political	science	between	interpretivists	and	those	
scholars	who	argue	for	the	primacy	of	the	‘British	Political	Tradition’.		Against	the	
background	of	those	debates,	the	article	then	develops	a	framework	for	applying	an	
‘historical	interpretivist’	approach	that	advocates	against	seeing	traditions	as	detached	from	
the	complex	contexts	within	which	individuals	actually	interpret	those	traditions.		This	
historical	interpretivist	framework	is	then	applied	to	the	events	of	1970-1980	to	draw	out	
two	competing	narratives	through	which	civil	servants	viewed	the	creation	and	release	of	
the	Osmotherly	rules.			
The	first	is	a	narrative	of	Westminster	constitutionalism,	which	privileges	the	
centrality	of	ministerial	responsibility	and	the	extent	to	which	secrecy	is	necessary	to	
maintain	the	trust	between	ministers	and	civil	servants	that	allows	the	Westminster	system	
to	function.	The	second	is	a	narrative	driven	by	values	of	democratic	accountability	that	
embraces	the	right	of	the	public	to	know	what	their	government	is	doing,	and	the	
importance	of	democratically	elected	MPs	being	able	to	publicly	scrutinize	the	work	of	un-
elected	civil	servants.		The	two	narratives	capture	the	dual	and	sometimes	competing	
accountabilities	of	civil	servants	to	their	ministers	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	legislature	on	
the	other.		The	two	narratives,	running	side-by-side,	contributed	to	the	‘web	of	beliefs’	
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which	shaped	the	views	of	senior	civil	servants	as	they	were	confronted	by	this	change	to	
long	established	practices.5	
Importantly,	these	duelling	narratives	will	be	shown	as	having	been	interpreted	
through	a	third	‘intervening’	narrative	with	the	power	to	trump	the	other	two	when	civil	
servants	were	translating	beliefs	into	action.		This	third	narrative,	based	on	an	acute	
understanding	of	strategic	and	tactical	imperatives,	can	be	read	as	civil	servants	seeing	their	
first	duty	as	being	to	protect	themselves	and	the	government	from	wider	embarrassment.		
In	other	words,	whatever	course	of	action	may	have	been	justified	under	narratives	of	civil	
service	tradition	and	‘open	government’	accountability,	it	would	only	be	implemented	if	it	
did	not	result	in	avoidable	political	embarrassment	for	ministers	or	civil	servants.	
	
I 
Recent	historiographical	debates	have	created	important	new	opportunities	for	bridging	the	
divide	between	the	complementary	but	frequently	dissonant	disciplines	of	political	history	
and	political	science.		In	2002	Pedersen	lamented,	with	some	justification,	that:	
In	an	era	of	relative	cultural	pessimism,	historians	have	been	more	concerned	
with	meaning	than	causation	and	have	found	literary	critics	and	
anthropologists	more	congenial	companions	than	political	scientists.		And	the	
latter	have	certainly	returned	the	cold	shoulder,	jettisoning	historical	
approaches	for	formal	modelling,	quantification	and	theories	of	rational	
choice.6		
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Things	have	changed.		Over	the	past	decade	the	‘new	political	history’	has	begun	to	
reconcile	the	study	of	history	from	below	with	the	‘high	politics’	school,	whilst	
simultaneously	offering	synergies	with	what	we	might	call	the	constructivist	turn	in	political	
science.7		Historians	have	demonstrated	a	renewed	interest	in	studying	individual	leaders	in	
their	full	historical	context,	complementing	an	equal	willingness	within	some	parts	of	
political	science	to	essentially	‘bring	history	back	in’	to	political	theory.		Whether	through	
the	growth	of	‘historical	institutionalism’	as	a	means	for	explaining	the	seeming	stickiness	of	
institutional	culture,	or	through	the	increasing	interest	in	individual	agency	as	a	driver	for	
political	change,	political	science	is	embracing	history	as	something	other	than	a	
complicating	variable	for	quantitative	investigations	of	‘rational’	behaviour.8	
	 Nowhere	is	this	embrace	more	clearly	visible	than	in	the	kind	of	interpretative	
political	science	advocated	by	Mark	Bevir	and	Rod	Rhodes,	which	in	many	ways	sees	the	
application	to	contemporary	politics	of	the	kind	of	perspectives	often	championed	in	
historical	studies	of	high	politics.		As	David	Craig	noted	in	2010,	the	work	of	historians	like	
Maurice	Cowling	has	long	suggested	that	the	study	of	interactions	between	important	
individuals	is	just	as	central	for	understanding	politics	as	studying	wider	systemic	cleavages	
based	on	class	or	economic	standing.9		Following	Collingwood	and	others,	Cowling	wrote	
history	as	experienced	through	the	eyes	of	influential	people,	in	search	of	interpretations	
rather	than	wider	objective	truths.		High	politics	as	envisaged	in	Cowling’s	work	is	the	study	
of	history	as	seen	through	the	ideas	of	those	who	lived	it.10		In	defending	Cowling’s	legacy,	
Craig	persuasively	identifies	the	high	politics	approach	as	being	a	natural	relative	of	the	
interpretative	approach	in	the	social	sciences.11		But	as	Craig	notes,	citing	Bevir,	individual	
beliefs	must	still	be	situated	within	the	‘traditions’	and	‘webs	of	belief’	that	help	to	give	
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institutional	shape	to	a	group	of	people	who	together	build	shared	beliefs	about	what	it	is	
that	they	are	or	should	be	doing.12		
The	concept	of	‘tradition’	has	become	an	important	lens	through	which	both	political	
scientists	and	historians	have	tried	to	understand	the	workings	of	British	government	under	
the	Westminster	system.		There	has	been	considerable	debate	about	how	many	traditions	
there	actually	are,	and	the	degree	to	which	they	work	to	shape	the	behaviour	of	individual	
politicians	and	civil	servants.		Advocates	of	the	British	Political	Tradition	argue	that	there	is	
one	dominant	tradition	that	has	framed	British	government	and	governance	for	decades	if	
not	centuries.13		The	elements	of	this	British	Political	Tradition	(BPT),	and	whether	it	is	
dominant,	remain	contested	and	are	drawn	from	various	contributions	that	have	shaped	the	
idea	over	the	past	fifty	years.14		A	recent	summary	of	the	BPT	is	provided	by	Blunkett	and	
Richards	who	identify	the	core	tenets	as	support	for	a	‘liberal	notion	of	representative	
democracy’,	‘a	conservative	notion	of	responsibility’,	and	‘an	emphasis	on	the	need	for	
responsible	government’.15		Some	supporters	of	the	BPT	argue	that	the	influence	of	the	BPT	
is	so	strong	over	time	that	it	has	become	embedded	in	the	system	–	that	in	a	sense	it	
provides	an	ideational	frame	that	can	shape	how	actors	will	interpret	what	they	should	do.16		
They	allow	for	other	traditions,	but	suggest	that	the	BPT	enjoys	a	power	asymmetry	over	
them.17	
By	contrast,	the	interpretivist	approach,	best	encapsulated	in	the	work	of	Bevir	and	
Rhodes,	has	argued	that	no	one	single	tradition	can	claim	dominance	in	its	influence	on	how	
people	behave.		They	nominate	at	least	four	underlying	traditions	–	liberalism,	socialism,	
Whiggism	and	Toryism	–	on	which	individuals	may	draw	when	confronted	by	change	in	the	
form	of	a	‘dilemma’.18		For	Bevir	and	Rhodes,	agency	is	paramount	as	each	individual	
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examines	their	beliefs	and	desires	through	the	lens	of	tradition	to	shape	how	they	will	act	in	
any	given	circumstance.		That	is	why	they	don’t	limit	the	field	of	possible	traditions	to	the	
four	identified	above,	but	are	open	to	the	idea	that	there	may	be	many	and	contradictory	
traditions	in	operation	at	any	one	time,	including	seeing	the	civil	service	tradition	itself	as	
drawing	on	multiple	traditions.19		The	interpretivist	approach	has	come	under	challenge	
from	realists,	and	in	particular	from	critical	realists	who	criticize	the	interpretivist	approach	
to	agency	by	arguing	that	it	is	possible	to	allow	for	agency	without	jettisoning	the	power	of	
institutions	to	shape	behaviour.20	
This	article	does	not	seek	to	assert	that	institutions	have	no	capacity	to	shape	
behaviour,	but	rather	that	people	themselves	determine	the	extent	to	which	any	
combination	of	institutional	structures,	traditions,	their	own	beliefs,	and	situational	context	
impact	on	how	they	choose	to	behave.		Using	a	study	of	the	creation	of	the	Osmotherly	
rules,	I	argue	that	no	single	tradition	holds	its	intellectual	shape	sufficiently	over	time	to	be	
isolated	and	identified	as	the	key	motivating	tradition	in	any	given	circumstance.		It	is	
argued	here	that	action	and	behaviour	are	always	contextual,	and	so	by	definition	the	
traditions,	beliefs,	and	institutional	structures	that	help	to	shape	behaviour	are	also	
contextually	shackled.		Traditions	and	beliefs	interact	in	complex	ways	with	their	wider	
environment,	leaving	individuals	to	grasp	at	whichever	components	best	make	sense	to	
them	in	the	particular	decision-making	context	they	find	themselves	in.			
The	ideas	encapsulated	in	the	BPT	are	undoubtedly	powerful	and	can	influence	the	
behaviour	of	civil	servants	and	their	political	masters,	but	only	as	one	line	of	tradition	that	is	
intersecting	with	multiple	other	traditions	at	the	given	point	in	time	that	someone	is	
considering	how	to	act.		Individuals	simultaneously	hold	multiple	traditions	in	their	head,	
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which	interact	with	their	beliefs	and	the	external	environment	to	shape	behaviour	at	each	
point	in	time.	For	example,	in	this	article,	a	‘Westminster	system-based	civil	service	
tradition’	is	identified	as	having	an	impact	on	the	beliefs	of	civil	servants.		This	civil	service	
tradition	might	sometimes	interact	with	a	wider	British	Political	Tradition,	and	either	one	
may	impact	on	civil	servants	as	the	traditions	themselves	interact	with	the	specific	context	
in	which	actors	are	making	a	decision.	
Tradition	is	by	definition	about	continuity	over	time.		But	one	cannot	seek	to	
understand	traditions,	or	their	force	in	influencing	contemporary	decision-making,	without	
locating	them	contextually	in	the	historical	circumstances	from	which	they	were	derived	and	
in	which	they	operate.21		Not	every	person	will	interpret	traditions	in	the	same	way	when	
faced	with	the	same	set	of	circumstances	in	the	same	environment	because	they	will	each	
be	influenced	differently	by	their	interpretation	of	the	interaction	between	that	
environment	and	particular	traditions	and	beliefs.		Ontologically,	traditions	remain	
constructs	that	need	to	be	read	and	interpreted	by	the	actors	who	give	them	form	through	
the	narratives	that	they	use	to	encapsulate	them.			
As	the	next	sections	will	show,	some	civil	servants	and	ministers	welcomed	the	
greater	scrutiny	of	select	committees,	and	the	broader	idea	of	‘open	government’	whereas	
others	viewed	both	with	trepidation.		Operating	in	the	same	environment,	and	subject	to	
the	same	traditions,	different	people	interpreted	issues	differently.		Some	saw	the	
Osmotherly	rules	and	select	committees	through	a	lens	of	democratic	principles,	and	some	
saw	them	through	more	conventional	lenses	of	ministerial	accountability,	under	which	civil	
servants	should	remain	anonymous,	subsumed	for	formal	purposes	into	the	identity	of	their	
minister.	
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In	arguing	that	traditions	remain	shackled	to	context,	I	mean	context	in	its	fullest	
sense,	both	narrow	and	broad.		In	the	narrow	sense,	the	impact	of	a	particular	tradition	on	
the	view	of	an	individual	civil	servant	will	be	filtered	through	the	other	component	parts	of	
the	environment	in	which	they	are	operating.		This	may	include	the	influence	of	the	views	of	
their	colleagues	and	superiors,	the	culture	within	their	particular	subsection,	and	the	
unrelated	personal,	political,	and	administrative	pressures	that	they	are	operating	under.		
Ontologically,	it	remains	very	much	an	ideationally	and	emotionally	constructed	form	of	
context,	but	this	makes	it	no	less	significant	in	determining	how	closely	a	tradition	is	
adhered	to	at	a	given	point	in	time.		In	the	same	way,	context	in	its	wider	form	–	i.e.	outside	
the	micro	or	local	level	–	will	include	not	just	the	strength	of	traditions	but	also	elements	of	
personal	judgement,	wider	government	priorities,	and	questions	of	timing.		For	example,	
whilst	their	might	have	been	an	adherence	to	traditions	of	Westminster	constitutionalism	in	
the	Cabinet	Office,	the	extent	to	which	that	tradition	determined	behaviour	could	be	
mediated	by	other	factors,	rendering	some	concession	to	open	government	principles	as	the	
most	viable	course	of	action	when	dealing	with	the	Osmotherly	rules.			
So	rather	than	focussing	on	traditions	only	as	ideas	that	travel	through	time,	this	
article	argues	for	seeing	traditions	as	tethered	to	the	historical	context	in	which	they	are	
interpreted.		In	other	words,	the	defining	anchor	becomes	the	context	rather	than	the	
tradition	itself.		To	understand	the	behaviour	of	individuals,	we	need	to	examine	the	range	
of	traditions	they	were	exposed	to	at	a	particular	point	in	time,	and	how	those	traditions	
interacted	with	the	specific	environment	in	which	they	found	themselves.		This	type	of	
analysis	requires	a	form	of	historical	interpretivism.	
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		An	historical	interpretivist	approach	uses	the	insights	of	interpretivism	as	a	way	of	
understanding	behaviour,	but	argues	for	the	primacy	of	historical	context	as	the	key	
determinant	of	which	particular	traditions	will	shape	the	‘web	of	beliefs’	in	which	a	person	
operates	at	a	specific	point	in	time.		Historical	interpretivism	argues	for	a	deep	examination	
of	the	communications	between	individuals	within	their	historical	context	as	a	way	for	
understanding	how	they	interpreted	the	world,	and	the	particular	elements	of	tradition	that	
they	wished	to	apply	to	it.		Historical	interpretivism	argues	that	traditions	are	not	re-shaped	
each	time	they	are	interpreted,	but	rather	that	they	are	only	one	factor	amongst	many	that	
shape	the	temporal	decision-making	context	in	which	people	like	civil	servants	and	
politicians	find	themselves.		The	many	other	factors	in	any	given	case	could	include:	the	
changing	nature	of	the	governance	environment;	government	policy	towards	accountability	
or	transparency;	fears	of	how	decisions	might	look	in	the	media;	internal	debate	with	
colleagues;	public	opinion;	and	the	need	to	avoid	public	embarrassment.		The	list	is	
potentially	vast,	and	each	factor	will	interact	in	a	different	way	with	the	various	traditions	
that	help	individuals	make	sense	of	their	particular	circumstances.		In	other	words,	tradition	
is	a	prisoner	of	context	in	its	capacity	to	shape	the	behaviour	of	individuals.	
Historical	interpretivism	as	a	method	remains	a	scholarly	construct	retrospectively	
applied	to	the	study	of	past	events	from	a	more	beneficial	distance.		It	reads	events	through	
the	eyes	of	those	experiencing	them,	but	can	only	recover	an	imperfect	portion	of	that	
experience.		Actors	may	have	knowingly	made	strategic	calculations	weighing	the	full	
context	in	which	they	found	themselves	against	the	background	traditions	that	informed	
their	actions;	but	equally	they	may	have	simply	made	instinctively	prudent	judgements	at	a	
more	subconscious	level,	utilising	arguments	which	can	only	be	organized	into	more	
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systematic	narratives	by	subsequent	scholarly	analysis.		Either	way,	a	historical	interpretivist	
perspective	is	able	to	provide	an	assessment	that	encompasses	the	same	contextual	
challenges	and	observations	faced	at	the	time	by	the	actors	themselves.	
The	interpretivist	approach	has	shown	over	the	last	two	decades	that	the	best	way	
to	understand	what	people	think	is	to	look	at	what	they	say	and	write	and	how	they	act.		It	
is	in	studying	the	behaviour	of	people	that	their	beliefs,	ideas,	governing	narratives	and	
motivations	are	revealed.22		As	Rhodes’	recent	work	demonstrates,	an	ethnographic	
approach	allows	researchers	to	watch	civil	servants	in	operation	to	see	what	their	behaviour	
reveals	about	the	underlying	beliefs,	traditions	and	stories	that	shape	how	bureaucratic	
departments	function.23	
The	potential	of	historical	interpretivism	is	thus	already	embedded	in	the	
interpretivist	approach,	which	stresses	the	importance	of	historical	factors	in	shaping	
traditions.		Interpretive	scholars	stress	that	beliefs	and	actions	cannot	be	studied	in	
isolation,	but	rather	must	be	seen	within	the	full	context	of	the	webs	of	belief	that	surround	
people	as	they	try	to	negotiate	their	way	through	the	complex	world	around	them.		This	
entails	a	commitment	to	what	Bevir	terms	‘meaning	holism’,	to	seeing	how	history,	tradition	
and	convention	shape	the	beliefs	of	individuals	at	one-and-the-same	time	as	those	beliefs	
are	shaping	and	re-shaping	actions.24	
More	importantly,	meaning	holism	implies	that	social	explanation	requires	us	not	
only	to	relate	actions	to	beliefs,	but	then	to	make	sense	of	these	beliefs	by	locating	
them	in	the	larger	webs	of	belief	that	give	them	their	content.	It	thereby	undermines	
formal	and	ahistorical	explanations,	and	leads	instead	to	contextualizing	and	
historicist	explanations.25	
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In	their	portrayal	of	public	administration	as	‘storytelling’,	Bevir	and	Rhodes	emphasize	the	
importance	of	narratives	as	being	the	building	blocks	that	both	reflect	belief	and	shape	
action.26		When	confronted	by	proposed	changes	to	established	practices	–	what	
interpretivists	call	‘dilemmas’	–	individuals	assess	competing	narratives	to	revise	their	
beliefs	and	construct	new	traditions	of	practice.27				Rhodes	argues	that	a	‘dilemma	arises	for	
an	individual	or	group	when	a	new	idea	stands	in	opposition	to	existing	beliefs	or	practices	
and	so	forces	a	reconsideration	of	the	existing	beliefs	and	associated	tradition’.28			
The	creation	and	release	of	the	Osmotherly	rules	in	the	1970s	created	a	classic	
‘dilemma’	in	this	interpretivist	sense.		It	threatened	to	alter	established	beliefs	and	practices	
that	were	central	to	how	civil	servants	operated.		The	traditional	anonymity	of	civil	servants	
would	be	compromised	by	appearing	before	select	committees,	and	the	privileged	nature	of	
communications	between	ministers	and	civil	servants	would	be	threatened	with	exposure	
through	parliamentary	questioning.		Rhodes,	Wanna	and	Weller	have	demonstrated	how	
governing	traditions	and	narratives	are	central	to	establishing	what	Westminster	means	to	
the	people	who	operate	within	it.29		The	evidence	from	the	archives	presented	in	following	
sections	will	show	how	senior	civil	servants	and	their	ministers	responded	to	the	‘dilemma’	
of	the	Osmotherly	rules	by	weighing	up	duelling	narratives	in	order	to	reconcile	the	changes	
with	their	underlying	beliefs	about	what	Westminster	means.	
Taking	an	historical	interpretivist	approach	to	primary	source	historical	documents	
provides	for	a	rich	observational	experience	not	dissimilar	in	some	ways	to	the	benefits	
derived	from	ethnographic	methods.		This	is	particularly	so	within	the	vast	available	
resource	of	civil	service	paper	files.		Paper	files	allow	for	the	study	not	just	of	a	document’s	
face-value	content,	but	also	of	the	various	scribblings	and	thoughts	appended	to	the	file	by	
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the	many	hands	through	which	it	passed.		It	allows	for	the	study	of	the	iterative	nature	of	
policymaking,	and	the	degree	to	which	changes	are	resisted	or	embraced	by	the	ideas	and	
beliefs	of	the	agents	whose	job	it	is	to	carry	out	change.	
	 This	kind	of	historical	interpretivist	approach	is	particularly	useful	in	seeking	to	
understand	the	functioning	of	the	senior	civil	service.		The	traditional	position,	to	quote	
Chapman,	is	that	‘…all	aspects	of	the	executive	work	of	British	central	government	are	
largely	shrouded	in	mystery’.30		Long	renowned	as	an	institution	that	wields	its	immense	
political	and	administrative	power	away	from	the	public	gaze,	the	Civil	Service’s	formal	rules	
and	institutionalized	structures	can	act	as	barriers	to	effective	study	of	how	power	at	the	
top	actually	works.		An	interpretive	approach	to	historical	documents	enables	an	inside	view	
of	how	senior	civil	servants	really	saw	their	roles	and	what	they	really	thought	of	
government	policy.	
	 Like	all	methods,	historical	interpretivism	also	retains	certain	drawbacks	and	
limitations.		Whilst	it	allows	for	in-depth	analysis	and	thick	descriptions	of	particular	
narratives,	traditions,	and	events,	its	reliance	on	interpretations	of	historical	documents	
does	not	allow	for	the	kind	of	triangulation	that	could	otherwise	be	provided	by	semi-
structured	interviews	or	other	similar	data	sources.		Nor	can	it	deliver	a	definitive	
interpretation	of	any	one	particular	event,	recognising	that	there	are	as	many	possible	
interpretations	as	there	are	individual	actors,	notwithstanding	the	shared	traditions	and	
narratives	that	shape	individual	responses.		But	in	revealing	the	traditions	that	underpin	
action,	and	relating	them	to	the	historical	context	in	which	those	actions	occur,	historical	
interpretivism	reveals	the	dynamic	nature	of	human	decision-making	in	areas	that	at	first	
glance	might	seem	relatively	static	and	path	dependent.	
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	 Methodologically,	the	study	on	which	this	article	is	based	utilizes	tools	of	qualitative	
content	analysis	to	reveal	the	traditions,	narratives	and	interpretations	inherent	in	the	views	
of	civil	servants	as	they	confronted	potential	changes	to	the	Osmotherly	rules.		Material	was	
examined	inductively,	coded,	and	then	sorted	into	categories	to	reveal	the	narratives	at	
play.		The	object	of	coding	in	qualitative	content	analysis	is	to	sort	text	into	categories	
through	a	process	of	‘selective	reduction’	to	arrive	at	categories	that	are	‘exhaustive’,	
‘exclusive’	and	‘enlightening’.31		In	other	words,	the	categories	must	capture	all	components	
of	the	data,	remain	distinctive	from	each	other,	and	be	relevant	to	the	question	under	
study.			
For	this	study,	archival	records	were	examined	from	the	Civil	Service	Department	
(CSD),	the	Cabinet	Office,	and	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office,	including	various	pieces	of	
correspondence	with	departments	including	Treasury,	Defence,	and	the	Foreign	and	
Commonwealth	Office.		The	material	was	originally	coded	into	six	thematic	categories	that	
emerged	inductively.		These	categories	were:	1)	accountability	and	responsibility	under	
Westminster	convention;	2)	meaning	of	‘open	government’;	3)	protection	of	civil	servants	
and	their	relationship	with	ministers;	4)	strategic	thinking	and	decision-making	by	civil	
servants;	5)	informal	or	implicit	understandings	of	appropriate	behaviour;	and	6)	internal	
conflicts	of	views.		These	six	categories	were	then	collapsed	into	three	broader	categories	in	
order	to	isolate	the	three	overarching	narratives	reflected	in	the	material,	which	are	
discussed	in	depth	in	the	next	section	of	this	article.	
The	time	period	for	the	study	–	1970-1980	–	was	chosen	as	it	covers	three	key	stages	
in	the	development	of	the	Osmotherly	rules.		It	begins	with	the	internal	revision	of	the	still	
confidential	guidance	in	1971-2;	proceeds	to	the	arguments	about	whether	this	guidance	
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should	be	released	to	the	Procedure	Committee	of	the	House	of	Commons	in	1977-8;	and	
finishes	with	the	arguments	over	its	final	official	release	in	1980.		The	focus	on	this	one	
crucial	decade	allows	for	sufficient	breadth	to	capture	changes	in	interpretations	over	time,	
whilst	also	enabling	sufficient	depth	to	apply	the	level	of	detailed	analysis	of	
correspondence	that	an	historical	interpretivist	approach	demands.		
	
II 
The	constitutional	soul-searching	over	the	proper	shape	and	role	of	the	Civil	Service	in	the	
1970s	began	in	many	ways	with	the	publication	of	the	Fulton	Report	in	1968.		Amongst	its	
findings	was	the	perception	that	civil	servants	were	too	remote	from	the	British	people,	and	
it	recommended	that	they	take	on	a	more	visible	role:	‘the	convention	of	anonymity	should	
be	modified	and	civil	servants,	as	professional	administrators,	should	be	able	to	go	further	
than	now	in	explaining	what	their	departments	are	doing.’32		It	was	an	appeal	for	openness	
and	accountability	that	both	politicians	and	civil	servants	could	not	afford	to	ignore.	
This	Fulton-inspired	drive	for	change	underpinned	the	first	narrative	which	emerges	
from	the	civil	service	correspondence	on	the	Osmotherly	rules,	which	is	one	centred	on	the	
idea	of	democratic	accountability,	encapsulated	in	what	might	be	called	the	‘open	
government’	agenda.		In	1971,	the	decision	was	taken	to	revise	the	internal	guidance	
document	for	civil	servants	appearing	before	parliamentary	committees	in	order	to	support	
a	more	open	and	responsive	style.		When	the	Parliamentary	Secretary	for	the	CSD	–	David	
Howell	–	was	sent	a	draft	of	the	proposed	revised	rules	in	1971,	he	was	concerned	that	it	
did	not	sufficiently	align	with	the	government’s	public	accountability	objectives.		In	a	
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confidential	minute,	one	official	noted:		‘This	was	the	situation	when	we	put	the	draft	to	the	
Parliamentary	Secretary.		He	did	not	like	it.		His	objections	were	that	it	was	a	very	anti-open	
government	document.		I	am	bound	to	say	that	in	MG	we	all	agreed	with	him	but	had	felt	
constrained	by	the	existing	rules’.33	
The	Lord	Privy	Seal	subsequently	wrote	to	the	Prime	Minister,	Edward	Heath,	about	
the	general	relationship	of	the	revised	guidance	to	a	more	open	style	of	government.	
I	understand	that	the	guidance	embodied	in	the	memorandum	reflects	what	I	
might	call	the	orthodox	line	which	has	evolved	in	the	years	since	the	
Specialist	Select	Committees	were	first	established.		However,	I	believe	that	it	
would	be	right	and	consistent	with	our	philosophy	if	officials	were	to	adopt	a	
more	forthcoming	approach	in	a	number	of	respects.		First,	I	believe	that	the	
encouragement	we	have	given	to	senior	civil	servants	accepting	a	greater	
personal	responsibility	for	the	execution	of	policies,	which	is	inherent	in	the	
movement	towards	greater	delegation	and	the	concept	of	departmental	
agencies,	requires	us	to	allow	a	wider	range	of	official	witnesses…Secondly,	I	
believe	that	we	should	move	away	from	the	rigid	doctrine	about	the	extent	
to	which	officials	should	discuss	policy	matters…34	
The	Prime	Minister	responded	on	25	April	1972,	stating	that	he	was	unpersuaded	of	
the	desirability	of	allowing	civil	servants	a	wider	power	to	discuss	policy	with	select	
committees.35		Within	the	CSD,	the	Prime	Minister’s	intervention	was	seen	as	having	
decided	the	matter.	
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We	now	have	the	Prime	Minister’s	reply	to	the	Lord	Privy	Seal’s	proposals	of	
24	March.		It	is	distinctly	unfavourable.		In	effect,	we	have	been	turned	down	
on	all	three	of	the	suggestions	which	the	Lord	Privy	Seal	made.		The	Prime	
Minister	doesn’t	even	think	that	any	more	detailed	instruction	on	the	
attendance	of	official	witnesses	is	necessary,	and	wishes	to	be	consulted	
before	any	change	even	to	the	existing	guidelines	is	made.		In	the	
circumstances,	I	don’t	see	much	point	in	seeking	to	contest	this	decision.		The	
time	is	obviously	not	ripe	for	these	changes	yet	(though	I	am	convinced	
myself	that	they	will	come).36		
The	willingness	of	CSD	officials	to	align	themselves	with	a	more	‘open	government’	
approach,	only	to	be	stymied	by	the	Prime	Minister,	is	notable.		It	suggests	that	any	
interpretation	of	the	Civil	Service	as	always	instinctively	protecting	existing	procedures	in	its	
own	self-interest	is	too	narrow.		The	political	agenda	of	a	departmental	minister	could	and	
did	find	support	amongst	civil	servants,	even	if	it	was	ultimately	blocked	by	the	Prime	
Minister.	
	 Equally,	the	ultimate	unwillingness	by	Prime	Minister	Heath	to	endorse	a	wider	and	
more	open	role	for	civil	servants	in	front	of	parliamentary	committees	revealed	that	the	
commitment	to	open	government	at	the	top	political	level	did	not	run	deep.		A	prime	
minister	of	long	parliamentary	and	ministerial	experience	reverted	to	a	traditional	view	of	
the	need	to	balance	openness	with	the	established	precepts	of	ministerial	responsibility.		
The	episode	also	reveals	that	the	persuasive	power	of	the	newly	established	Civil	Service	
Department	was	not	strong	enough	to	unseat	the	more	protectively	conservative	views	
championed	in	the	Cabinet	Office.		The	Fulton-driven	exhortation	towards	openness	had	not	
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succeeded	in	displacing	the	traditional	Cabinet	Office	ability	to	command	the	ear	of	the	
prime	minister	on	matters	of	administrative	convention.	
In	the	late	1970s,	as	the	Procedure	Committee	of	the	House	of	Commons	requested	
a	copy	of	the	thus	far	confidential	guidance	document,	the	same	internal	debate	re-
emerged	between	supporting	‘open	government’	and	the	need	to	protect	the	position	of	
civil	servants	in	front	of	select	committees.		The	outgoing	Head	of	the	Civil	Service,	Sir	
Douglas	Allen,	was	largely	comfortable	about	sharing	the	document,	suggesting	it	was	
consistent	with	a	commitment	to	open	government.	
I	have	shown	Sir	Douglas	Allen	your	minute	of	22	December.		He	has	looked	
quickly	through	the	relevant	guidance	GEN	76/78	and	at	a	quick	reading	he	
finds	it	difficult	to	see	anything	in	this	guidance	which	could	not	be	given	to	
the	Select	Committee.		He	is	reinforced	in	this	view	by	our	present	policy	
approach	towards	openness	generally.		He	therefore	considers	that	the	right	
course	would	be	to	put	to	Ministers	the	proposal	that	we	can	see	no	
objection	to	issuing	the	guidance	in	full,	and	to	ask	them	whether	they	have	
any	objection.37	
Allen	had	throughout	his	reign	as	Head	of	the	Civil	Service	been	an	advocate	for	freedom	of	
information	and	a	more	open	style	of	government,	so	his	stance	is	not	necessarily	
surprising.38		However,	Allen’s	general	inclination	towards	openness	did	not	immediately	
sway	the	strong	objections	of	other	civil	servants	working	on	the	matter,	who	determined	to	
convince	him	of	the	alternative	case.39	
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The	matter	was	raised	with	the	Cabinet	Secretary,	Sir	John	Hunt	in	January	1978.		A	
Minute	from	the	new	Permanent	Secretary	to	the	Civil	Service	Department,	also	the	Head	of	
the	Home	Civil	Service,	Sir	Ian	Bancroft,	outlined	the	background	to	the	request	from	the	
Procedure	Committee,	before	asking	for	Hunt’s	views.	
In	favour	of	complete	disclosure	is	our	general	stance	on	openness	following	
the	line	taken	by	the	Prime	Minister	and	Douglas	Allen’s	letter	of	July	1977	on	
disclosure	of	official	information…On	the	other	hand,	there	are	arguments	
against	disclosure	of	the	document	as	it	stands.		It	was	not	drafted	with	
publication	in	mind,	and	therefore	contains	some	infelicitous	phrases,	apart	
from	generally	being	written	in	a	tone	which	just	might	be	regarded	as	
provocative…40	
Bancroft	was	quite	willing	to	make	clear	his	own	preferences	having	weighed	up	those	
arguments.	
Despite	the	contrary	arguments,	my	own	feeling	is	that	I	would	like	to	put	to	
Ministers	the	proposal	that	we	should	issue	the	document	as	it	stands.		I	
accept	there	are	some	risks	of	embarrassment	in	this	course	but	I	do	not	
think	any	of	the	embarrassments	are	great	enough	to	justify	going	against	
our	general	“open	government”	stance.41	
Hunt	agreed	that	‘…in	itself	disclosure	would	be	a	disadvantage	not	a	disaster,	
whereas	refusal	would	be	difficult	to	square	with	the	Government’s	general	stance	on	open	
government	and	could	provoke	a	confrontation’.42		Such	a	conclusion	from	both	Bancroft	
and	Hunt	appears	to	have	been	ultimately	very	much	a	pragmatic	one.		As	Hennessy	notes	
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in	his	history	of	Whitehall,	Bancroft	was	‘not	an	open	government	man’	and	Hunt	was	a	
politically	astute	protector	of	Cabinet	Office	power,	so	neither	would	have	felt	driven	by	
philosophical	inclination	to	publish	a	document	of	this	kind.43		A	minute	from	the	Lord	
President,	Michael	Foot,	to	the	Prime	Minister	on	the	23rd	January	1978	confirmed	that	the	
‘open	government’	view	had	won	the	day.		‘Despite	the	difficulties,	the	meeting	agreed	that	
the	risks	of	embarrassment	in	full	disclosure	would	not	be	sufficient	to	justify	going	against	
our	“open	government”	stance’.44			
Foot’s	willingness	to	support	the	kind	of	openness	that	Heath	had	baulked	at	half	a	
decade	before	perhaps	demonstrates	how	the	strength	of	the	open	government	agenda	
had	grown	over	time.		What	had	seemed	at	the	outset	of	the	1970s	to	be	an	uncomfortable	
and	perhaps	unworkable	ideal	could	by	the	end	of	the	1970s	be	seen	by	both	Labour	and	
Conservatives	as	something	that	could	no	longer	actually	be	ignored	in	decision-making	
without	causing	confrontation	and	potential	backlash.		Certainly	Labour	had	committed	
themselves	to	an	‘open	government’	agenda	as	far	back	as	the	Wilson	governments	of	the	
1960s,	so	their	support	of	it	in	the	late	1970s	was	no	longer	new	nor	radical.			
On	the	Conservative	side,	under	Heath	the	instinctive	traditionalism	of	the	prime	
minister	with	regards	to	the	Civil	Service	was	buttressed	by	wariness	from	the	Cabinet	Office	
about	openness,	despite	CSD	support	for	it.45		Once	back	in	opposition	under	Thatcher,	the	
Conservatives	swung	behind	a	policy	position	advocating	for	stronger	surveillance	of	the	
executive	by	the	legislature	through	select	committees.		The	public	release	of	the	
Osmotherly	rules	in	1980	was	commensurate	with	that	commitment,	with	the	Leader	of	the	
House	-	Norman	St	John-Stevas	–	overseeing	the	establishment	of	the	new	select	committee	
structure.					
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In	summary,	the	files	make	clear	that	both	civil	servants	and	ministers	were	not	only	
aware	of	the	‘open	government’	agenda,	but	that	many	were	willing	to	support	it	even	
where	there	was	some	risk	of	embarrassment	to	the	government.		In	other	words,	the	
democratic	accountability	tradition	was	a	powerful	component	of	the	decision-making	
matrix.		Equally,	individual	civil	servants	voiced	clear	preferences	for	and	against	the	
document’s	release,	highlighting	the	degree	to	which	individual	views	played	an	important	
role	in	internal	debates.		Civil	servants	did	not	demonstrate	an	instinctively	uniform	
adherence	to	protecting	themselves	from	public	scrutiny,	but	instead	carefully	weighed	the	
arguments	for	and	against,	based	on	their	interpretation	of	the	government’s	wider	‘open	
government’	agenda.		Of	course,	this	does	not	mean	that	civil	servants	were	ready	to	
jettison	the	protective	aspects	of	the	guidance	altogether,	as	revealed	in	the	second	
narrative	that	runs	through	the	correspondence.	
The	second	narrative	that	emerges	from	the	files	centred	on	the	need	to	defend	
established	Westminster	system	traditions	in	order	to	make	government	work.		The	1971	
guidance	document	picked	up	on	sentiments	first	set	out	in	1958	by	then	Cabinet	Secretary	
Norman	Brook,	with	a	focus	on	the	need	to	avoid	‘political	controversy’.46	
If	[sic]	is	for	officials	to	answer	questions	of	fact,	to	explain	the	administrative	
reasoning	behind	a	policy,	and	to	answer	questions	in	the	field	between	day-
to-day	administration	and	high	policy	which	might	be	called	“administrative	
policy”.		But	if	they	are	asked	questions	in	the	field	of	political	controversy,	
using	the	term	in	its	widest	sense,	they	should	say	that	this	is	a	matter	for	
Ministers	on	which	they	cannot	answer.47	
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Set	out	equally	clearly	was	the	need	to	preserve	the	conventions	of	collective	ministerial	
responsibility.	
Departmental	witnesses,	whether	in	closed	or	open	session,	should	preserve	
the	collective	responsibility	of	Ministers	and	their	departments	by	not	
revealing	(except	so	far	as	this	is	implied	in	what	is	proposed	in	para	26	
below)	the	level	at	which	decisions	were	taken...It	should	also	be	borne	in	
mind	that	decisions	taken	by	Ministers	collectively	are	normally	announced	
and	defended	by	the	minister	responsible	as	his	own	decisions	and	it	is	
important	that	no	indication	should	be	given	of	the	manner	in	which	a	
Minister	has	consulted	his	colleagues.48	
Internally,	officials	debating	the	potential	contents	of	the	1971	revised	guidance	
were	determined	that	the	document	should	reflect	the	flows	of	responsibility	and	
accountability	in	the	Westminster	system.		‘As	I	said	in	my	minute	of	1	December,	the	
confidentiality	of	the	advice	given	to	Ministers	seems	to	me	to	be	a	fundamental	feature	of	
our	system.		This	is	not	inconsistent	with	developments	towards	greater	delegation	and	
accountability...’49	
Concerns	about	protecting	Westminster	traditions	were	strongest	within	the	Cabinet	
Office,	where	Cabinet	Secretary	Burke	Trend	penned	a	minute	to	the	Prime	Minister.		Whilst	
he	focussed	his	remarks	on	the	undesirability	of	revealing	to	select	committees	the	details	
of	cabinet	committees,	he	touched	on	the	core	arguments	against	a	more	open	approach	in	
general.	
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The	reasons	why	successive	Governments	have	always	refused	to	disclose	
these	details	derive,	basically,	from	the	almost	instinctive	attitude	of	any	
Government	that	the	Executive	should	present	a	single,	unified	front	to	the	
Legislature….the	trust	and	confidence	between	colleagues,	which	are	
essential	to	the	honest	discussion	of	differences	of	view,	could	not	be	
expected	to	survive	intact	if	the	means	by	which	those	differences	are	
resolved	were	exposed	to	public	examination.50	
The	right	of	the	executive	government	to	protect	its	internal	workings	from	
parliamentary	scrutiny	remained	a	key	theme	when	officials	were	discussing	the	potential	
release	of	the	document	to	the	Procedure	Committee	in	1977/8.		One	official	reflected	on	
the	absolute	central	part	that	privacy	of	advice	played	in	effective	government.	
Reflecting	on	the	phone	conversation	we	had	on	this,	the	argument	that	
looms	large	in	my	mind	is	the	point	that	if	all	central	governmental	directions	
to	individual	members	of	the	Civil	Service	are	to	be	potentially	liable	to	
publication,	it	will	become	increasingly	difficult	for	any	effective	instructions	
to	be	given	in	many	areas	of	public	administration…It	may	be	argued	that	
instructions	to	civil	servants	as	to	how	to	conduct	themselves	when	
confronted	by	a	committee	of	Members	of	Parliament	are	a	special	case,	but	
I	do	not	think	this	is	so.51	
In	summary,	some	senior	civil	servants	interpreted	their	role	as	protecting	the	
conventions	that	underpin	the	successful	workings	of	the	Westminster	system.		Giving	too	
much	power	to	select	committees	to	question	civil	servants	might	undermine	the	levels	of	
internal	trust	upon	which	effective	relationships	between	cabinet	ministers,	and	between	
		 25	
ministers	and	civil	servants,	relied.		In	acting	as	guardians	of	these	conventions,	civil	servants	
projected	their	motivations	as	not	just	being	about	protecting	the	Civil	Service	per	se,	but	
protecting	the	wider	ability	of	cabinet	government	to	function	effectively.		The	fact	that	
publication	of	the	guidance	did	ultimately	occur	must	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	incoming	
Thatcher	Government’s	wider	commitment	to	a	stronger	and	more	rigorous	select	
committee	system,	championed	by	Norman	St	John-Stevas	as	Leader	of	the	House.	
The	third	narrative,	which	I	characterize	here	as	an	‘intervening	narrative’,	
emphasized	that	the	first	duty	of	senior	civil	servants	was	always	to	protect	their	ministers	
and	the	wider	civil	service	from	public	embarrassment.			This	‘intervening	narrative’	could	
trump	both	the	need	to	support	an	open	government	agenda	and	the	need	to	maintain	the	
traditions	of	Westminster	governance	if	either	threatened	avoidable	humiliation	of	the	
government.		It	represented	an	institutionalized	instinct	towards	self-preservation	and	the	
need	to	avoid	what	might	be	termed	‘own	goals’.	
This	intervening	narrative	shares	a	similar	genealogy	to	the	second	narrative,	in	that	
it	draws	on	the	constitutional	tradition	that	civil	servants	and	ministers	are	both	indivisible	
components	of	the	executive	who	must	therefore	protect	each	other,	but	what	sets	it	apart	
is	its	sheer	pragmatism.		Whereas	the	second	narrative	around	defending	Westminster	
traditions	works	to	block	moves	towards	greater	openness,	the	third	intervening	narrative	
allows	the	embrace	of	openness	if	that	is	what	is	required	to	spare	embarrassment	to	
ministers	or	the	civil	service.		It	is	a	narrative	that	privileges	strategic	thinking	and	political	
awareness	over	and	above	any	one	conception	of	the	relationship	that	ministers	and	civil	
servants	should	maintain	with	each	other.				
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In	1977	an	initial	draft	response	to	the	Procedure	Committee’s	request	for	a	copy	of	
the	guidance	was	provided	to	the	CSD’s	Permanent	Secretary,	Sir	Douglas	Allen,	for	
consideration.		The	accompanying	minute	emphasized	the	dilemmas	that	would	be	inherent	
in	releasing	the	written	guidance	to	the	Procedure	Committee.	
The	latter	request	takes	us	into	very	difficult	territory	indeed.		It	will	be	
necessary	to	tread	an	exceedingly	narrow	path	between	demonstrating	the	
readiness	of	the	Civil	Service	to	be	as	helpful	as	possible	to	House	
Committees,	and	making	clear	that	there	are	a	number	of	kinds	of	
information	that	really	cannot	be	disclosed,	including	the	CSD	guidance	
circular	itself	(GEN	76/78).52	
The	official	who	drafted	the	minute	–	Sandy	Russell	–	penned	a	further	minute	listing	
in	greater	detail	his	concerns	about	the	potential	release	of	the	memorandum.		His	concerns	
highlight	his	interpretation	of	the	difficulties	inherent	in	making	civil	servants	accountable	to	
two	masters	–	the	executive	and	the	parliament.		It	placed	them	in	the	awkward	position	of	
having	to	protect	information	that	their	ministers	might	not	want	released,	and	as	a	result	
face	the	opprobrium	of	MPs	on	committees	who	would	see	civil	servants	as	obstructing	the	
right	of	democratically	elected	representatives	to	know	what	the	government	was	doing.		
Russell	segmented	these	difficulties	into	specific	points.	
(a)	It	could	well	make	life	more	difficult	for	departments	when	dealing	with	
select	committees.		Committees	would	be	given	ammunition	to	challenge	
departments	when	they	were	exercising	their	discretion	to	refuse	
information,	by	placing	a	different	interpretation	on	the	relevant	part	of	the	
guidance.		The	detail	with	which	the	document	necessarily	deals	with	each	of	
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the	reasons	for	not	disclosing	information	would	provide	plenty	of	toe-holes	
for	committees	to	create	additional	difficulties	for	Civil	Service	witnesses.53	
Russell	went	on	to	point	out	that	the	reason	the	guidance	had	been	maintained	as	an	
internal	government	document	up	to	this	point	was	that	it	acted	as	a	training	manual	for	
civil	servants	on	how	to	avoid	tactical	missteps	in	front	of	a	select	committee.	
(b)	By	its	nature	the	document	is	partly	a	tactical	guide	for	Civil	Servants	on	
how	not	to	get	“boxed	in”	so	that	they	are	required	to	supply	more	
information	than	the	Government	would	wish	to	expose.		This	is	a	perfectly	
legitimate	exercise	of	internal	government	administration	but	could	be	badly	
misinterpreted	if	taken	out	of	context.54	
In	further	internal	correspondence	in	January	1978,	officials	discussed	problems	with	
specific	paragraphs	in	the	guidance	and	what	reaction	they	might	draw	if	they	were	made	
public.		Michael	Townley	in	the	Cabinet	Office	wrote:	
…	knowledge	of	the	document	would	be	likely	to	make	the	position	of	official	
witnesses	more	difficult	by	making	public	the	limits	to	which	they	can	be	
pushed.		These	limits,	as	stated,	must	inevitably	be	matters	of	opinion	and	
judgement.		At	the	moment,	it	is	the	witness’	private	judgement,	but	if	the	
criteria	are	publicly	known,	he	seems	bound	to	be	pressed	further.55	
Ultimately,	ministers	decided	to	release	the	document	to	the	Procedure	Committee.		
A	formal	reply	was	provided	under	the	signature	of	the	Lord	Privy	Seal	(Lord	Peart)	and	
hand-delivered	to	the	Clerk	of	the	Procedure	Committee	along	with	20	copies	of	the	
Guidance	Memorandum.		The	Procedure	Committee	went	on	to	append	a	copy	of	the	
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guidance	to	their	official	report	–	effectively	making	it	a	public	document.		But	in	doing	so,	
the	Committee	offered	little	critique	of	the	rules,	meaning	the	public	release	did	not	
therefore	attract	wide	media	scrutiny.			
This	became	apparent	in	1979/80	as,	despite	the	document’s	effective	public	release	
by	the	Procedure	Committee	the	year	before,	officials	began	a	fresh	internal	dialogue	of	
concerns	and	arguments	about	the	proposed	public	release	of	the	guidance	by	the	Thatcher	
Government.		Some	departments	were	very	keen	to	make	changes	to	the	guidance,	whilst	
the	CSD	was	keen	to	minimize	any	change	to	the	version	released	to	the	Procedure	
Committee	in	1978.56	
The	Department	of	Defence	was	very	awake	to	the	dangers	involved	in	the	greater	
publicity	that	would	flow	to	civil	servants	who	appeared	before	select	committees.		They	
lobbied	for	new	wording	such	as:	‘In	giving	evidence	for	broadcasting,	witnesses	should	
remember	that	a	slip	of	the	tongue,	hesitation	or	use	of	a	particular	tone	or	emphasis	may	
attract	public	comment	where	it	otherwise	might	not’.57		In	reply,	the	CSD	was	willing	to	
allow	some	statement	of	warning	about	avoiding	slips	of	the	tongue,	but	stated	that:	‘I	
would	myself	expect	witnesses	to	be	only	too	well	aware	of	the	danger	of	conveying	
unintended	nuances	when	proceedings	are	being	recorded’.58	
	 In	summary,	there	were	clearly	strong	concerns	within	the	Civil	Service	around	how	
a	public	release	of	the	guidance	document	might	impact	on	the	protections	available	to	civil	
servants	appearing	before	select	committees.		The	document	was	seen	as	a	shield,	whose	
removal	could	make	life	much	more	difficult	for	civil	servants	trying	to	avoid	embarrassing	
themselves	in	front	of	MPs.		Ironically,	the	public	release	of	the	document	by	the	Procedure	
Committee	in	1978	ultimately	attracted	such	little	controversy	that	some	departments	were	
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still	arguing	over	whether	it	should	be	publicly	released	in	1979-80,	despite	its	effective	
release	the	year	before.	
	 This	awareness	of	the	need	to	protect	the	Civil	Service	was	coupled	with	a	clear	
strategic	awareness	that	the	best	way	to	ensure	their	protection	was	to	strategically	protect	
ministers	from	embarrassment.		Individual	civil	servants	displayed	an	astute	strategic	and	
tactical	awareness	of	the	realities	of	politics	in	a	parliamentary	system.		For	example,	when	
the	Procedure	Committee	approached	the	government	in	1977	to	procure	a	copy	of	the	
guidance,	civil	servants	were	well	aware	of	the	political	consequences	of	the	various	
responses	they	could	make.		One	CSD	official	–	Sandy	Russell	–	whilst	against	releasing	the	
guidance,	was	also	aware	of	the	problems	that	would	ensue	from	any	attempt	to	instead	
sanitize	the	document	before	releasing	it.		‘We	think	there	would	be	a	great	danger	that	the	
reissue	of	a	revised	document	would	be	seen	by	the	Committee	as	a	rather	contrived	way	of	
shielding	information	from	the	Committee	and	could	well	lead	to	accusations	of	bad	faith’.59		
There	was	also	the	danger	that	the	CSD,	as	‘keeper’	of	the	guidance,	might	itself	get	drawn	
into	battles	between	departments	and	select	committees.		Russell’s	colleague,	J.B.	Pearce,	
noted:		‘[W]hether	the	document	itself	is	released	or	not,	we	will	need	to	be	careful	to	avoid	
any	suggestion	that	the	CSD	can	be	drawn	into	acting	as	an	arbitrator	between	Select	
Committees	and	departments	through	its	“guardianship	of	the	doctrine”.		There	is	obviously	
a	risk	of	this’.60	
When	revising	the	document	for	release	by	the	Thatcher	Government,	a	minimalist	
approach	to	change	on	tactical	grounds	certainly	found	favour	with	the	relevant	officials	in	
the	Cabinet	Office,	especially	given	the	newly	‘public’	nature	of	the	document.	
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In	general,	however,	I	am,	as	you	know,	entirely	in	agreement	with	the	
proposed	low-key	approach	to	this	revision	since	I	suspect	that	it	would	be	a	
major	tactical	error	if	Departments	were	to	try	and	define	at	this	stage	the	
range	of	information,	and	the	conditions	for	its	disclosure,	that	they	were	
prepared	to	make	available	to	the	expanded	select	committee	system…In	any	
event	it	may	be	better	for	agreements	on	disclosure	to	particular	committees	
to	be	recorded	on	a	private	basis,	rather	than	in	what	must	now	be	regarded	
as	a	public	memorandum.61	
A	similar	tactical	awareness	was	shown	in	advocating	against	a	proposal	to	discuss	
the	revision	of	the	document	with	MPs	on	the	Liaison	Committee.		Civil	servants	judged	that	
consultation	at	this	stage	would	effectively	encourage	MPs	to	get	involved	–	which	was	seen	
as	an	undesirable	outcome.	
I	have	spoken	to	Mr	Townley	about	consultation	with	the	Liaison	Committee	
on	the	Memorandum.		He	would	be	inclined	to	advise	Mr	St	John	Stevas	not	
to	consult	the	Committee.		He	thinks	that	they	would	undoubtedly	conceive	
it	their	duty	to	subject	it	to	fundamental	re-examination,	and	that	they	might	
come	up	with	major	proposals	which	reflected	members’	individual	
viewpoints	rather	than	according	with	the	more	carefully	considered	views	of	
the	Procedure	Committee.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	Memorandum	was	not	
volunteered	but	simply	handed	over	if	and	when	it	was	requested,	with	the	
comment	that	this	was	simply	the	previous	Memorandum	slightly	revised	to	
bring	it	up	to	date,	he	thought	the	Government	could	not	fairly	be	
criticised.62	
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This	tactical	approach	was	fully	endorsed	by	ministers	when	the	argument	was	put	to	
them.63		Tactics	could	extend	even	to	such	questions	as	whether	to	put	a	cover	on	the	
document	when	it	was	published.		One	official	noted:	‘I	would	not	myself	favour	putting	a	
cover	on	the	Memorandum.		We	want	this	to	look	as	much	as	possible	like	the	original	
Memorandum	GEN	76/78,	which	was	published	by	the	Procedure	Committee	in	their	
report…’64	
In	summary,	the	files	reveal	the	extent	to	which	civil	servants	could	be	both	intensely	
aware	of	tradition	and	yet	intensely	practical	at	the	same	time.		Whilst	some	saw	it	as	a	
necessity	that	the	conventions	of	Westminster	government	not	be	undermined,	there	was	
no	naivety	about	how	their	arguments	might	be	perceived	or	received	by	MPs	and	the	wider	
public.		The	relevant	correspondence	abounds	with	a	tactical	political	awareness	of	how	
different	options	would	play	out.	
III 
An	historical	interpretivist	approach	to	the	civil	service	files	shows	how	senior	civil	servants	
confronted	the	‘dilemma’	of	the	Osmotherly	rules	by	weighing	up	the	claims	of	two	
competing	traditions	–	the	Westminster	system-based	civil	service	tradition	and	the	
democratic	accountability	tradition.		These	traditions	revealed	themselves	as	narratives	that	
run	through	the	relevant	correspondence	in	the	files.		The	traditional,	constitutionalist	
narrative	of	how	a	Westminster	system	civil	service	is	supposed	to	work	provided	the	initial	
frame	of	reference.		Embedded	in	that	civil	service	tradition	is	a	narrative	about	what	is	
‘properly’	the	preserve	of	ministers	and	what	is	properly	the	role	of	civil	servants.		This	
expressed	itself	in	concerns	that	select	committees	might	push	civil	servants	into	revealing	
the	details	of	their	advice	to	ministers,	and	that	this	would	threaten	the	foundational	trust	
		 32	
on	which	the	system	relies.		Existing	conventions	on	ministerial	accountability	were	seen	as	
providing	vital	protection	to	civil	servants	being	pushed	for	answers	by	MPs.	
Officials	were	clear	that	any	set	of	rules	about	how	they	should	behave	in	front	of	
select	committees	needed	to	make	sure	that	civil	servants	did	not	become	the	‘fall	guy’	for	
questions	that	should	more	legitimately	have	been	directed	at	ministers.		But	importantly,	
civil	servants	did	not	see	themselves	as	engaging	in	blocking	tactics	against	the	government	
of	the	day.		Rather,	their	views	reflected	their	own	belief	that	their	role	was	to	work	with	
ministers	to	protect	against	the	‘unwestminsterly’	incursions	of	parliamentary	committees	
into	the	business	of	executive	government.	
Arranged	alongside	the	narrative	of	Westminster	constitutionalism	was	the	
democratic	oversight	narrative	about	the	rights	of	democratically	elected	MPs	to	
transparently	hold	all	parts	of	the	executive	government	to	account.		This	meant	that	not	
only	should	ministers	be	available	to	be	questioned	in	parliament	and	the	media,	but	that	
civil	servants	should	make	themselves	available	to	answer	in	detail	for	their	stewardship	of	
the	public’s	interests.		This	narrative	manifested	itself	in	a	commitment	to	ideals	of	‘open	
government’	and	greater	powers	for	the	legislature	to	scrutinize	the	executive	through	an	
expanded	select	committee	system.	
The	files	show	that	senior	civil	servants	did	not	share	a	uniform	interpretation	of	the	
meaning	of	these	narratives,	or	indeed	which	of	the	two	narratives	should	be	privileged	
over	the	other.		This	is	where	Bevir’s	exhortation	to	adopt	a	holism	approach,	informed	by	
historicism,	becomes	important	for	fully	understanding	the	context	that	underpinned	these	
strategic	beliefs.		For	example,	many	of	the	bureaucratic	supporters	of	the	‘open	
government’	agenda	were	found	in	the	Civil	Service	Department,	which	had	only	been	
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formed	in	1968.		Its	establishment	followed	from	the	Fulton	report’s	view	that	control	of	the	
Civil	Service	should	be	moved	away	from	the	Treasury	and	that	the	opaque	style	of	Civil	
Service	workings	needed	to	be	updated	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	modern	world.		CSD	was	
therefore	on	a	mission	to	establish	its	own	identity	and	contribution	to	government	and	had	
very	sound	reasons	for	supporting	the	political	arm	of	the	executive	in	its	pursuit	of	open	
government	principals.		CSD	interpretations	of	the	‘democratic	accountability	tradition’	
were	therefore	shackled	to	the	particular	circumstances	and	context	in	which	the	
department	found	itself.	
In	contrast,	the	strongest	resistance	to	the	idea	of	‘open	government’	and	of	civil	
servants	having	frank	discussions	in	front	of	select	committees	came	from	within	the	
Cabinet	Office.		Long	established	at	the	centre	of	government,	with	much	of	its	perceived	
power	attached	to	its	proximity	to	the	prime	minister	and	its	ability	to	discretely	enforce	its	
power	across	Whitehall,	the	Cabinet	Office	had	little	reason	to	embrace	a	more	open	and	
democratic	narrative	about	what	it	should	be	doing.		Its	job	was	to	support	ministers,	who	
would	in	turn	do	their	job	and	report	to	parliament	as	they	saw	fit.		The	Cabinet	Office	saw	
themselves	as	the	guardians	of	the	ancient	tenets	of	the	Westminster	system,	and	that	
belief	governed	their	caution	about	embracing	change.	
Yet	these	beliefs,	and	the	traditions	in	which	they	were	grounded,	were	also	
mediated	further	by	other	contextual	factors	like	the	relationship	between	particular	
personalities,	and	they	extent	to	which	some	leaders	were	trying	to	protect	or	expand	their	
own	turf.		As	Lowe’s	official	history	of	the	civil	service	lays	bare,	figures	like	Sir	Douglas	
Allen,	Sir	William	Armstrong,	Sir	John	Hunt	and	others	were	in	a	permanent	but	often	
unacknowledged	tug-of-war	for	both	personal	and	institutional	power.65		Personal	ambition	
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played	its	part,	as	did	professional	jealousy.		These	contextual	factors	must	therefore	be	
taken	into	account	in	arriving	at	definitive	explanations	for	why	individuals	attached	
themselves	to	a	particular	tradition	or	traditions	when	deciding	on	the	appropriate	course	
of	action.			
	 And	yet,	whilst	underlying	beliefs	and	traditions	shaped	the	views	of	senior	civil	
servants,	they	coupled	these	with	a	very	high	level	of	political	and	strategic	awareness.		It	
re-confirms	that	senior	civil	servants	did	not	equate	being	impartial	with	being	unaware	of	
the	potential	political	consequences	of	their	actions.		In	the	midst	of	decision-making	
dilemmas,	beliefs	and	traditions	had	to	be	weighed	against	practical	realities	such	as	the	
possibilities	of	embarrassing	ministers.		Adopting	a	meaning	holism	approach	reveals	the	
complex	interplay	that	occurs	in	the	minds	of	individuals	as	they	weigh	up	the	various	
components	that	influence	their	decision-making.		For	example,	in	1978	civil	servants	had	
the	strategic	awareness	that	it	might	be	less	damaging	if	they	simply	summarized	the	rules	
for	the	Procedure	Committee	rather	than	releasing	the	full	document,	but	also	had	the	
political	awareness	to	realise	that	this	could	be	seen	as	‘doctoring’	the	document	for	public	
consumption.			
Civil	servants	saw	themselves	as	having	a	legitimate	role	to	play	in	helping	the	
government	to	avoid	political	as	well	as	administrative	pitfalls.		Regardless	of	the	depth	of	
their	attachment	to	either	the	Westminster	system-based	civil	service	tradition	or	to	ideas	
of	democratic	accountability,	civil	servants	allowed	them	to	be	trumped	by	a	third	narrative	
grounded	in	pragmatic	assessments	of	the	governance	environment,	i.e.	that	it	was	first	and	
foremost	their	duty	to	support	the	government	of	the	day	by	avoiding	embarrassment	to	
ministers	or	the	Civil	Service.		This	was	both	a	question	of	belief	about	what	the	
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fundamental	duty	of	the	Civil	Service	was,	and	an	understanding	that	the	fate	of	the	Civil	
Service	was	at	some	level	inextricably	linked	to	that	of	ministers;	that	if	mistakes	were	made	
in	how	they	approached	questions	of	public	accountability,	both	would	suffer	the	
consequences	in	terms	of	public	criticism.	
	 There	was	a	strong	protective	instinct	amongst	some	of	the	officials	involved	in	both	
the	CSD	and	the	Cabinet	Office	about	the	rights	of	civil	servants	to	have	some	protective	
guidance	with	which	to	resist	the	questioning	of	MPs.		Officials	showed	awareness	of	the	
underlying	tension	between	displaying	their	constitutional	loyalty	to	the	government	of	the	
day	and	being	seen	to	unduly	obstruct	the	democratic	workings	of	the	parliament.		Even	in	
this	pre-24/7	media	age,	officials	were	aware	that	MPs	had	the	ability	to	raise	a	‘song	and	
dance’	against	the	Civil	Service	for	being	seen	to	stifle	the	legitimate	requests	of	
democratically	elected	representatives.66			
Through	a	close	study	of	these	historical	files	with	an	interpretivist	lens,	bureaucracy	
comes	to	life	not	simply	as	a	coherent	institutional	machine,	but	as	a	collection	of	people	
with	differing	interpretations	of	the	competing	civil	service	and	democratic	traditions.		
Ultimately,	civil	servants	examined	these	traditions	in	this	case	through	the	pragmatic	lens	
of	the	contemporary	political	context,	to	guide	their	actions	as	they	determined	how	best	to	
respond.		The	context	shaped	the	weight	that	each	of	them	was	willing	to	give	to	each	
tradition	in	interpreting	their	own	role.	
An	historical	interpretivist	approach	of	this	kind	offers	potential	new	methodological	
avenues	and	substantive	areas	for	further	research.		It	enables	political	historians	to	
emphasize	the	centrality	of	historical	context	for	understanding	political	events	and	
institutions,	in	a	way	that	connects	with	existing	approaches	in	the	political	science	
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literature.		For	political	scientists,	it	holds	the	promise	of	grounding	theoretical	
developments	more	fully	within	an	historical	understanding	of	how	traditions	have	been	
lived	out	within	British	political	institutions	over	time.		It	demonstrates	not	just	how	
essential	both	disciplines	are	for	understanding	the	political	world,	but	the	fruitfulness	of	
pursuing	those	understandings	in	tandem	rather	than	in	isolation	from	each	other.	
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